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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines attitudes towards immigration across a range of countries in Europe. In 
line with the current literature we find evidence that both economic and non-economic factors 
shape attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants. However, we also show that the relative 
importance of these factors depends crucially on the race of the arriving immigrants. We find 
that economic considerations are more likely to shape attitudes towards the arrival of same 
race immigrants, while immigrants of a different race are perceived to have a negative impact 
on the country’s culture. Moreover, educated natives perceive labour market competition from 
arriving immigrants of the same race only. 
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 1. Introduction 
Immigration is often a hotly debated topic and one that is likely to loom large in 
political and media circles throughout Europe and the U.S. as worsening economic conditions 
take hold. Tensions between natives and immigrants are often portrayed, in the media at least, 
as being at their worse in an economic downturn as immigrants and natives compete for 
scarce jobs and public resources.1 With this in mind, this paper investigates the degree to 
which economic and non-economic factors affect attitudes towards further immigration in 
Europe, and perhaps more importantly it examines the extent to which these factors vary with 
the race or ethnicity of the arriving immigrants. 
The effect immigrants have on the native population has been investigated in a number 
of papers, across a wide range of countries. However, despite the plethora of studies in this 
area, research that focuses specifically on Europe is rare.2 This is surprising since Europe, and 
especially countries within the European Union (EU) have experienced large influxes of 
foreign labour following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the recent expansions of the 
EU.
3
 In addition, the resulting evidence on the factors which shape immigration preferences 
appears mixed. On the one hand, a large literature has developed which finds that attitudes 
towards immigration are strongly shaped by economic self-interest (see, for example, Mayda, 
2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; and Kessler, 2001). Scheve and Slaughter (2001), for 
example, argue that an individual’s attitude toward immigration is influenced by his/her 
position in the labour market and find that less skilled (more skilled) individuals are more 
(less) likely to oppose immigration. Facchini and Mayda (2008) argue that such a finding is 
consistent with the fact that, on average, immigrants to the U.S. are unskilled. Similarly, 
Mayda (2006) finds that skilled individuals are more likely to favour immigration in countries 
where the relative skill composition of natives relative to immigrants is high and vice versa.
4
 
It would thus appear that native workers are more likely to oppose immigration when they 
feel threatened by labour market competition from migrants. In contrast, Hainmueller and 
                                                
1
 For example, the Daily Telegraph (UK): ‘Recession will fuel racial tensions, Hazel Blears admits’, January 
11
th
, 2009; Times (UK): ‘Wildcat strikes over foreign workers spread across Britain’, January 30
th
, 2009; Irish 
Times (Ireland): ‘Balance needed on immigration – Lenihan’, November 12
th
, 2008. 
2
 See, for example, Facchini, et al. (2007), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Citrin et al. (1997) and Espenshade and 
Hempstead (1996) for the U.S.; Dustman and Preston (2001) for the UK; Hainmuller and Hiscox (2005) for 
Europe; and Facchini and Mayda (2008)  and Mayda (2006) for a range of countries including the U.S., Canada 
and Japan.  
3
 There have been five enlargements to the EU since its creation in 1957, with the largest expansion on the 1
st
 
May 2004 when ten new members joined.  
4
 Such findings are consistent with the labour market predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model whereby if 
natives are more skilled than immigrants, immigration should reduce the supply of skilled workers relative to 
unskilled workers and raise the skilled wage, whereas the opposite is true in countries with a low skill 
composition of natives relative to immigrants. 
  
 
4 
Hiscox (2005), using European data, find that the relationship between education (which is 
often used as a proxy for skill) and attitudes towards immigrants has little to do with fears of 
labour market competition. Similarly, Citrin et al. (1997) find little role for personal economic 
circumstances in shaping attitudes towards immigrants, while Dustmann and Preston (2001) 
assert that racial prejudice is the most important factor.  
It should be noted that a drawback of many of these papers is that they assume that 
natives view all immigrants in the same way.
5
 However, it is likely that attitudes towards 
immigration may also vary with the race and ethnicity of the arriving immigrants. Thus 
grouping immigrants together is likely to produce mixed results since, for example, the 
composition of the arriving immigrants (i.e., whether same race/different race) is likely to 
change across countries and over time. Another limitation of much of the current work is that 
it focuses on a single cross-section, or a series of repeated cross-sections. 
We attempt to address these limitations by conducting an analysis of attitudes towards 
immigration using three waves of data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a 
particularly rich data set for examining some of the issues surrounding immigration. In 
particular, it enables us to investigate the extent to which these attitudes vary with the race or 
ethnicity of the arriving immigrants. In addition, although the ESS is not a panel and hence 
the same individuals cannot be ‘tracked’ over time we are, nevertheless, able to use the data to 
construct a pseudo panel (see, for example, Deaton, 1985) in order to track different ‘cohorts’ 
over time. Moreover, a common method to gauge the impact foreign workers have on the 
domestic labour market is to control for the relative income and education (as a proxy for 
skill) of natives. We refine this approach and match in data from the European Union Labour 
Force Survey (EU LFS) to control for the proportion of non-nationals in an individual’s 
occupation and economic sector.
6
 We argue that this variable acts as a proxy for both the 
degree of labour market competition and the level of contact that individuals face from 
immigrants. The latter may have a positive effect on natives’ attitudes
7
, which may dominate 
any negative labour market effect.  
In line with other studies, we find that attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants are 
not only related to non-economic factors such as political ideology, cultural considerations, 
                                                
5
 An exception to this is Dustmann and Preston (2007) who look at different race immigrants. 
6
 Mayda (2006) constructs a similar variable: she matches each individual with the number of immigrants 
relative to natives in his/her occupation. She argues that occupations with a higher ratio of immigrants to natives 
than average have experienced a bigger increase in supply relative to other occupations, and according to a 
factor-endowment story individuals in these occupations should be less likely to be pro-immigration. 
7
 Card, et al. (2005) also suggest that greater contact with immigrants may either increase or decrease the 
perceived threat posed by immigrants. 
  
 
5 
and concerns about security, but are also shaped by economic factors and welfare 
considerations. However, perhaps crucially, we find that the relative importance of these 
factors depends on the race or ethnicity of the arriving immigrants and in doing so we make 
three important findings.  
First, we find that European attitudes towards further immigration are correlated with 
the proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s occupation and economic sector (Mayda, 
2006, finds a similar result). However, we show that in occupations/economic sectors 
characterized by a higher proportion of non-nationals, individuals are less likely to oppose 
same race immigrants, but are more likely to oppose the arrival of immigrants of a different 
race. Our results thus suggest that more contact with immigrants of the same race, who are 
more familiar to the native population, has a positive effect on attitudes towards further 
immigration, which prevails over any possible labour market effect. However, this is not the 
case for different race immigration. 
Second, our results also suggest that economic considerations are more likely to shape 
attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants of the same race. Severe macroeconomic 
conditions at home, gauged by a higher regional unemployment rate, cause Europeans to be 
against the arrival of same race immigrants. In contrast, immigrants of a different race are 
perceived to have a negative impact on the country’s culture.  
Third, we find that the perceived impact of the arriving immigrants on the country’s 
economy and culture is correlated with the respondent’s gender and education level. 
Interestingly, our results suggest that highly educated Europeans only perceive labour market 
competition from same race immigrants. Finally, in line with Dustmann and Preston (2007), 
we find evidence that social welfare considerations are also important in determining attitudes 
towards further immigration. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our data and 
presents some summary statistics. In Section 3, we present our methodology. Section 4 
outlines our main empirical results, while in Section 5 we conclude. 
 
2. Data  
This paper uses data from a number of sources: data on attitudes towards immigration 
is drawn from the European Social Survey (ESS) while information on country performance 
is obtained from Eurostat. 
The ESS is a biennial survey carried out in over 30 countries in Europe. The aim of 
this survey is to examine attitudes, beliefs and values across countries in Europe and some of 
  
 
6 
its close neighbours, and how they change over time and across countries. There are 
currently three rounds to the ESS
8
: 2001/2002, 2003/2004 and 2005/2006 and we focus on the 
countries for which we have at least two years worth of data, which includes: Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.9 
The ESS is a rich data set for examining some of the issues surrounding immigration 
and we use the answers to the following two questions to construct our measure(s) of the 
respondent’s attitudes towards the arrival of further immigrants: 1. ‘To what extent do you 
think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] 
people to come and live here?’, and 2. ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group 
from most [country] people?’ The survey allows for four ordered responses to both questions: 
‘allow many to come and live here’, ‘allow some’, ‘allow a few’, and ‘allow none’. We use 
these questions to construct three dichotomous variables. TightIm which takes the value 1 if 
the individual responds ‘allow none’ or ‘allow a few’ to either of the above questions (0 
otherwise). We use this variable to gauge the respondent’s attitude towards immigration 
regardless of the race of the arriving immigrants.10 However, we are also interested in the 
effect race has on attitudes towards immigration. We therefore create two further binary 
variables: TightImSame, which takes the value 1 if the individual responds ‘allow none’ or 
‘allow a few’ immigrants of the same race or ethnic group (0 otherwise), and TightImDiff, 
which takes the value 1 if the individual responds ‘allow none’ or ‘allow a few’ immigrants of 
a different race/ethnicity (0 otherwise).11  
The ESS also collects a host of information on the respondent’s socioeconomic 
background which is potentially important in shaping attitudes towards further immigration. 
This includes information on each individual’s social and political views, religious identity, 
demographics (including age, household size, education, parents’ country of birth), area of 
                                                
8
 The first round of the ESS had a specific extra module on migration and minority related issues not present in 
the other rounds. However, all rounds provide information on the overall attitudinal response of individuals to 
further immigration, and also direct responses to an array of questions concerning the perceived effect 
immigrants have on the economy. 
9 Table 1a in the Appendix provides the structure of the repeated cross-sections. Hungary, Italy and Ukraine also 
conducted the survey for at least two years but data on the proportion of non-national workers at the one-digit 
occupation and economic sector is not available for these countries and so they are dropped from our sample. 
10
 Mayda (2006), for example, uses responses to the question: ‘Do you think the number of immigrants to 
[respondent’s country] nowadays should be: a) reduced a lot; b) reduced a little; c) remain the same as it is; d) 
increased a little; and e) increased a lot’ to define a similar dependent variable. She uses this question to define a 
dichotomous dependent variable which takes the value 1 for those who respond that the number of immigrants 
should be ‘increased a little’ or ‘increased a lot’.  
11 For ease of notation we now refer to immigrants as simply same race or different race. 
  
 
7 
residence (city versus rural) and income (our proxy for economic status). 
Finally we use data from Eurostat to match in more objective measures of a country’s 
economic performance. We match data from the EU LFS
12
 on the size of the immigrant 
population in a particular occupation and economic sector: the proportion of non-national 
workers at the one-digit occupation and economic sector. We also match in data from Eurostat 
on the regional unemployment rate (at NUTS level 2), social security expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, GDP per capita in purchasing power standards, and total crimes recorded 
by the police as a proportion of the population. A full list of the variables used in this paper is 
given in Table 1. 
 
2.1 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of our main variables are given in Table 2. We find that although a 
high proportion of respondents want to limit the arrival of immigrants (48% in 2002 want to 
‘allow none’ or ‘allow a few’ immigrants), respondents appear less likely to want to limit the 
arrival of same race immigrants than those of a different race: 33% (in 2002) want to limit the 
arrival of same race immigrants compared to 46% (in 2002) for those of a different race, with 
similar proportions in other years. Respondents also appear more concerned about the effect 
immigrants have on the economy, or country as a whole, than they have on their country’s 
cultural life. Overall around 35% of respondents feel that immigration is bad for the economy 
or that a country is made a worse place to live by people coming here from other countries, 
while only approximately 25% of respondents think that a country’s cultural life is 
undermined by immigrants. 
Disaggregating these responses by country (Table 3) we find that there is substantial 
cross-country variation in attitudes towards immigration. A high proportion of Greeks (around 
80%) want to limit the arrival of immigrants, while respondents in Sweden, Switzerland and 
Ireland appear to favour immigrants.  
<< Table 3 here >> 
 
3. Empirical methodology: Pseudo Panel 
A key methodological issue is that the ESS is not a panel and hence the same 
individuals cannot be ‘tracked’ over time in order to examine how attitudes towards 
immigration in Europe have changed over time. We can, however, use the data to construct a 
                                                
12
 The EU LFS is a quarterly household survey carried out in all EU member states, candidate countries and 
EFTA countries (except Liechtenstein). 
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pseudo panel (see, for example, Deaton, 1985) in order to follow different cohorts over time 
in order to estimate relationships based on cohort means. This methodology has been widely 
used in applied research (Attanasio, 1993, for example, examines household savings in the 
U.S.; Deaton, 1997 looks at consumption patterns in Taiwan; and Pencavel, 1998 analyses 
labour markets in the U.S.).  
Suppose that our basic regression model is of the form:  
  itiitit xy εαβ ++′=           t=1,…,T                              (1) 
where i indexes individuals
13
 and t time periods, ity is our dichotomous dependent variable for 
individual i at time t, which takes the value 1 if the respondent wants to limit the arrival of 
immigrants (defined in the previous section), itx is our vector of explanatory variables thought 
to affect attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants with corresponding coefficients β , iα  is 
the individual fixed effect and itε is the error term. In this context, the individual fixed effects 
are likely to be correlated with some or all of the explanatory variables, which makes pooling 
the repeated observations an inappropriate approach.14  
Following Deaton (1985) we define a set of C cohorts such that in any time t 
individual i only belong to one of these cohorts. The observed cohort means then satisfy the 
relationship: 
ctctctct xy εαβ ++′=             c=1,…,C                                (2) 
where cty  is the average of ity  for all members of cohort c at time t and ctα  are the cohort 
fixed effects. Since we are not tracking the same individuals over time, ctα  is not constant 
over time t. Despite this, Deaton (1985) argues that if the cohort size is sufficiently large then 
ctα  is a good approximation for the cohort population, cα . Now equation (2) can be estimated 
by replacing ctα with a set of dummy variables, one for each cohort. 
Finally, Deaton (1985) also argues that there is potentially a measurement error 
problem arising from using cty  as an estimate of the unobservable population cohort mean 
and equation (2) should therefore be estimated using errors in variables techniques. However, 
the larger the cohort, the less important the measurement error problem is, and thus this 
approach is typically ignored if the number of observations per cohort (nc) is sufficiently 
                                                
13
 Since different individuals are observed in each period this implies that i runs from 1 to Nt for time period t. 
14
 In a genuine panel this can be solved by using a fixed effects approach and treating 
iα as a fixed unknown 
parameter.  
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‘large’ (see, for example, Browning et al. 1985 and Blundell et al. 1993).
15
  
Unfortunately, however, there is no general rule to judge whether the number of 
observations per cohort is large enough to use asymptotics based on nc. Verbeek (2008) 
argues that the asymptotic behavior of pseudo panel data estimators can be derived using 
alternative asymptotic sequences. A second type of asymptotics is based on a large number of 
cohorts of more or less constant size. Collado (1998) shows that in the case of binary choice 
models we need to divide the population into a large number of cohorts for our estimates to 
rely on asymptotics on the number of cohorts. He further demonstrates that it is possible to 
obtain a consistent within-groups estimator for binary choice models. 
We construct our pseudo-panel by defining cohorts based on six, ten-year interval age 
groups, one-digit economic sector classification, and one-digit occupation.16 The first age 
group includes individuals born before 1937. These respondents are at least 65 years old in 
the first round of the ESS and are likely to be retired throughout the sample period. The 
second age group comprises of individuals born in the period 1938-1947, and so on until the 
sixth age group which is made up of respondents born after 1977. For each of the six age 
groups we divide individuals according to their occupation and the economic sector in which 
they have their main activity.17 We use the one-digit NACE economic sector classification 
with 17 economic sectors and the one-digit ISCO88 occupation classification with 10 main 
occupations.  
It should be noted that we use both occupation and economic sector to define our 
cohorts since we want to include a proxy for both labour market competition and the level of 
contact that individuals face from immigrants. We argue that while occupation mainly 
captures the competition effect, economic sector allows natives to interact with immigrants in 
different occupations in the same sector. The other dimension of our cohort (ten-year interval 
age groups) allows for unobserved differences such as quality of education, skills and 
attitudes, and allows for homogeneity within cohorts and heterogeneity between cohorts.
18
  
We can thus construct a maximum theoretical number of 864 cohorts from our data: 6 
                                                
15
 Verbeek and Nijman (1992) suggest that in a cohort comprising of 100 individuals where the time variation in 
the cohort means is sufficiently large, the bias in the standard fixed-effects estimator will be small enough that 
the measurement error problem can be ignored.  
16
 Variables used in the literature to define cohorts include: age (Deaton, 1985); age and education (Blundell, et 
al, 1998); age and region (Propper, et al, 2001). 
17
 This classification refers to their last job for retired people and their parents’ job for young people still in full-
time education.  
18
 As we have already shown, attitudes towards immigration vary across countries. However, using countries to 
define our cohorts would cause the fixed effects to capture both the country specific effects together with age, 
occupation and economic sector effects. Since we include other country specific variables in our regressions, we 
prefer to control for country specific effects by including country dummies. 
  
 
10 
(age groups) x 16 (economic sectors) x 9 (occupations) = 864 cohorts.
19
  Given that there are 
three rounds of ESS data, our pseudo-panel could have a total maximum of 2,592 
observations. However, we do not observe individuals from each birth cohort in each 
occupation and economic sector in all three rounds. For this reason our pseudo-panel is an 
unbalanced panel of 2,134 observations for a total of 798 individuals (cohorts).20  
The important dimension of our pseudo panel is the large number of cohorts (798) as 
we are interested in estimating a binary choice model. Moreover, the average cohort size is 
134 individuals, which is large enough to reduce the measurement error as discussed above. 
Since the average cohort size disguises large variation within cohorts, we estimate by 
weighted least squares as is standard practice (see, for example, Propper et al, 2001). We also 
exploit the pseudo-panel nature of our data and employ a fixed-effects estimator which 
eliminates any unobserved fixed cohort specific factors (age-industry-occupation).21  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 4 reports our fixed effects estimates of opposition towards immigration 
(whether same race or different).22 The explanatory variables are separated into demographic, 
economic, and non-economic (social and political). We also include country dummies23 and 
times dummies in all our regressions.
24
 
We begin by looking at our baseline model (column 1) and find that males are less 
likely to favour the arrival of immigrants, as are those living in the city. Similarly, individuals 
from larger households are more likely to oppose the arrival of immigrants – these 
respondents may be more likely to make use of the welfare state (in terms of health services, 
education and social security benefits) and may perceive immigrants as competing with them 
                                                
19
 We exclude individuals employed in economic sector 17 (extraterritorial organizations), and those whose 
occupations are classified as armed forces. In doing so, we drop 72 observations only and our pooled cross-
section contains a total of 95,131 observations (see Table 1a in the Appendix). 
20
 Table 2a in the Appendix provides the structure for the unbalanced pseudo-panel dataset. 
21
 The construction of the pseudo-panel controls for fixed economic sector, occupation and age group differences 
and thus we control for differences within cohorts only and hence cannot include economic sector, occupation 
and age among the regressors. 
22
 Although we argue in Section 3 that pooling the data would be inappropriate in this setting, our main results 
are, nevertheless, robust to using a pooled probit. These results are not reported for brevity but are available on 
request.  
23
 In the pseudo-panel, the country dummies are the percentage of individuals from a given country. 
24
 In what follows our results are robust to the following two sensitivity analyses: 1. It is apparent from our 
summary statistics presented in Table 3, that Greece is the most anti-immigration country, while Sweden appears 
to favour immigration the most. Our results are robust to excluding these two countries from the analysis, and 2. 
Five of the countries in our sample (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) only joined the 
EU in May 2004 (the middle of our sample period). These countries have provided an outflow of workers to the 
older EU member countries. Our results are robust to excluding the new member states. The results obtained on 
these two restricted samples are not reported for brevity but are available on request. 
  
 
11 
for the same welfare benefits. Not surprisingly, respondents who were born abroad or who 
have at least one parent who was born abroad are less likely to want to limit immigration. 
Turning to our economic variables we begin by looking at the relationship between 
attitudes towards immigration and the size of the immigrant population in the respondent’s 
occupation/economic sector. As previously mentioned, we argue that this variable acts as a 
proxy for both the degree of labour market competition and the level of contact that 
individuals face from immigrants. Here we find that in occupations/industries characterized 
by a higher proportion of non-nationals, individuals are more likely to oppose immigration; 
the negative labour market effect prevails over any possible positive effect arising from 
increased contact with immigrants. Mayda (2006) finds a similar result. In contrast, we find 
that those on a higher income are less likely to want to limit the arrival of immigrants, while 
the opposite holds for those who believe that immigrants are bad for the economy. 
Employment status also has a role to play in this setting; individuals who define their main 
activity (in the last 7 days) as being in education appear to have more liberal views towards 
immigration. Interestingly those who classify their main activity as ‘other’ are more likely to 
oppose immigration than those who classify their main activity as unemployed (base 
category).25 Such a finding is clearly not due to competitive pressure from the arriving 
immigrants (these respondents are not in the labour market), but could arise due to the impact 
immigrants are thought to have on a government’s finances, security and crime levels.
26
 We 
investigate this further in what follows. 
Turning to our non-economic variables we find a positive association between 
individuals who feel that immigration is bad for a country’s culture (Mayda, 2006, finds a 
similar result) and those who want to limit the arrival of immigrants. Immigrants often come 
from different social backgrounds and may thus be perceived as undermining the cultural 
identity of the native population. Dustmann and Preston (2007) argue that prejudices of this 
kind may have their origins in a variety of sources, including a fear of losing national 
characteristics or a taste for cultural homogeneity. In contrast, we find that individuals who 
are religious are less likely to oppose the arrival of immigrants while respondents with a 
rightwing political ideology are more likely to favour a restrictive immigration policy.  
Finally, we find a positive association between individuals who feel that immigrants 
make the country a worse place to live (Bad for country) and opposition to immigration. In 
                                                
25
 The category ‘other’ includes individuals who are permanently sick or disabled, those doing housework or 
looking after children, those doing community or military service and other. 
26
 Blackaby et al. (2007) suggest that the economically inactive react in similar ways to benefit increases as the 
unemployed
  
 
12 
the last three columns of Table 4 (columns 2, 3 and 4) we investigate whether this belief is 
linked to more objective measures such as the ratio of social security benefits in total GDP, 
the crime rate, or economic performance (GDP per capita), and include the following 
interaction variables: Bad for country x SSGDP (column 2), Bad for country x crime rate 
(column 3), and Bad for country x GDP per capita (column 4). Here we find that in each 
specification the interaction terms have a positive sign, but are only significant in the case of 
social security spending.
27
 Thus, individuals perceive immigrants to worsen conditions 
through their impact on social security benefits, but believe that immigration makes a country 
a worse place to live irrespective of the crime rate or the overall level of economic 
prosperity.28 Respondents from countries with a higher ratio of social security expenditure to 
total GDP may fear that immigrants will benefit, at their expense, from their country’s welfare 
state. Dustmann and Preston (2007) also find that welfare concerns play a major role in 
determining attitudes towards immigration.  
 
4.1.  Do attitudes depend on the race of the arriving immigrants? 
We now examine the extent to which our results depend on the race of the arriving 
immigrants (Table 5) and split our sample between immigrants of the same race (Panel A) and 
different race (Panel B). 
We begin by looking at our baseline model (columns 1 and 6) and find that in 
occupations/economic sectors characterized by a higher proportion of non-nationals, 
individuals are less likely to oppose immigration if the arriving immigrants are of the same  
race, but are more likely to oppose immigrants of a different race. Our results thus suggest 
that more contact with immigrants of the same race, who are more familiar to the native 
population has a positive effect on attitudes towards immigration, which prevails over any 
possible labour market effect. However, this is not the case for different race immigration.  
We also find that economic considerations are more likely to shape attitudes towards 
immigrants of the same race. Severe macroeconomic conditions at home, gauged by a higher 
regional unemployment rate, cause Europeans to be against the arrival of same race 
immigrants, but has an insignificant effect on those of a different race. In contrast, individuals 
who work appear to have more liberal attitudes towards same race immigration, suggesting 
                                                
27
 Here we find that in each specification Bad for country becomes less significant with a smaller coefficient. 
28
 Interpreting coefficients when two continuous variables are interacted is difficult. An alternative approach 
would have been to use the demeaned variable as an interaction term. We have estimated separate regressions in 
which we have interacted Bad for country with deviations of SSGDP, crime rate and GDP per capita from their 
respective means over time. Results are similar and available on request. 
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that individuals who work do not fear labour market competition from same race 
immigrants. This supports our earlier finding that the positive effect of more contact with 
immigrants of the same race dominates the labour market effect. Another interesting finding 
is that those who classify their main activity as ‘other’ are more likely to oppose different race 
immigration than those who classify their main activity as unemployed (the base category). 
We argue that such a finding is not due to competitive pressure from arriving immigrants 
(these respondents are not in the labour market), but could, for example, arise due to the 
perceived impact immigrants have on a government’s finances, security and crime levels. 
Opposition towards immigrants of a different race appears to be based on cultural 
grounds; believing that immigration undermines the country’s culture is only significantly 
(and positively) associated with efforts to restrict immigration if the arriving immigrants are 
of a different race. In contrast, we find a positive association between individuals who feel 
that immigration makes the country a worse place to live and a restrictive immigration policy 
regardless of the race of the arriving immigrants. As before we investigate whether this belief 
is linked to more objective measures, and add the following interaction terms to our baseline 
specification: Bad for country x SSGDP (columns 3 and 6), Bad for country x crime rate 
(columns 4 and 9), and Bad for country x GDP per capita (columns 5 and 10). Here we find 
that the interaction terms only have a significant effect on attitudes towards immigration in 
the case of same race immigrants, which suggests that individuals from countries with a more 
generous welfare system, a higher crime rate
29
, and higher GDP per capita are more likely to 
oppose immigrants of the same race. In contrast, individuals perceive that different race 
immigration makes the country a worse place to live irrespective of the generosity of its 
welfare system, crime rate or the level of economic prosperity.  
<< Table 5 here >> 
4.2.  Gender and education 
Finally, we examine whether the economic, and perceived cultural threat posed by 
immigrants differs significantly with the respondent’s gender or educational attainment (Table 
6) and in doing so interact gender (Panel A) and education dummies (Panel B) with some of 
our key variables. 
<< Table 6 here >> 
                                                
29
 Although Butcher and Piehl (1998) find that immigrants in the U.S. have much lower rates of criminality than 
natives, they may indirectly contribute to crime if immigration leads to increased group conflict, or if social 
tensions lead to harassment or violence towards the immigrant population. We find that individuals appear to 
oppose same race immigration more as the crime rate in the host country increases, implying that immigrants are 
perceived to contribute to higher crime rates. 
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We begin by looking at the effects of gender and find that for males, the higher the 
proportion of non-nationals in the respondent’s occupation/economic sector the more likely 
they are to oppose the arrival of same race immigrants; men are clearly exposed to more 
competitive pressure from same race immigrants than women. In contrast, although overall 
immigrants are perceived as being bad for the economy, the gender interaction is negative; 
females are more likely than males to oppose immigration because they believe that 
immigrants have a detrimental effect on the economy. Finally, males are less likely than 
females to oppose the arrival of same race immigrants due to cultural concerns, but are more 
likely than women to oppose immigration because they believe that immigrants make the 
country a worse place to live.  
Turning to look at the effects of education (Panel B) we find that the higher the 
proportion of non-nationals in a given occupation/economic sector the more likely highly 
skilled natives are to oppose the arrival of same race immigrants
30
; highly skilled natives 
clearly perceive labour market competition from same race immigrants. This could arise 
because same race immigrants are more highly skilled.  
We find further indirect support for this hypothesis using additional data on education 
and country of birth from the EU LFS (see Table 3a in the Appendix).31 Table 3a confirms 
that immigrants born in an EU country are on average more educated than natives and non-
EU born immigrants. Similarly, Dustmann and Preston (2007) using data for the UK argue 
that economic competition from potential immigrants is perceived more strongly by higher 
skilled natives.  
Highly educated natives are also more likely than our base category (lower secondary 
and below) to oppose the arrival of different race immigration because they believe that 
immigrants have a negative impact on the economy, but are less likely than our base category 
to oppose the arrival of different race immigrants on cultural grounds or because they believe 
that they make the country a worse place to live. 
 
 
                                                
30
 Interacting the proportion of non-nationals in a given occupation and industry with our two education 
dummies (Panel B) we find that for immigrants of the same race the interaction terms are highly significant with 
a positive sign. Moreover, the coefficient is almost three times larger in magnitude for those with the highest 
level of education (post secondary) than for those educated to upper secondary; same race immigrants are clearly 
perceived by natives as being more educated/skilled.  
31
 It should be noted that a limitation of this data is that we cannot separate immigrants according to their 
race/ethnic origin; we only know whether immigrants were born in an EU or non-EU country. In addition, to 
find the closest match with the ESS we focus on data for 2007, the year of the last EU enlargement. 
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5. Conclusions  
This paper uses data from the European Social Survey and Eurostat over the period 
2001 to 2006 to analyse the extent to which economic and non-economic variables affect 
attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants in Europe. We find that, after controlling for 
various observed socioeconomic characteristics and allowing for cohort-specific fixed effects 
the relative importance of these factors in shaping attitudes towards immigration depends 
crucially on the race of the arriving immigrants. 
In particular, we find that economic considerations are more likely to shape attitudes 
towards the arrival of immigrants of the same race. Severe macroeconomic conditions at 
home, for example, captured by a higher regional unemployment rate, cause Europeans to 
oppose the arrival of same race immigrants, but have an insignificant effect on immigrants of 
a different race. Moreover, our results suggest that highly educated Europeans only perceive 
labour market competition from the arrival of same race immigrants. In contrast, immigrants 
of a different race are perceived to have a negative impact on the country’s culture. Finally, in 
line with Dustmann and Preston (2007), we find evidence that social welfare considerations 
are also important in determining attitudes towards further immigration. 
To conclude, immigration is clearly a very emotive issue and understanding how 
individuals perceive arriving immigrants is undoubtedly important in shaping a country’s 
immigration policy. This is particularly important within the EU where the free movement of 
persons is a general right. According to estimates from Eurostat, in 2006 alone, about 3.5 
million individuals settled in a new country in the EU.
32
 However, perhaps more importantly, 
understanding how individuals perceive arriving immigrants may help policy makers and the 
government alike identify and correct any misperceptions that may have arisen with respect to 
the effect immigrants have on their jobs and cultural life, and in doing so create a more 
integrated and harmonious society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Eurostat: Statistics in focus: 98/2008. 
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Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
TightIm TightIm gives responses to the following two questions:  
1) ‘To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic 
group as most [country] people to come and live here?’ 
2) ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?’  
The possible answers are: 1=‘allow many to come and live here’; 2=‘allow some’; 3=‘allow a few’; 
4=‘allow none’.  
TightIm =1 if answer ‘allow a few’ or ‘allow none’ to either of the above questions; 0 otherwise.  
 
TightImSame = 1 if answer ‘allow a few’ or ‘allow none’ people of the same race or ethnic group as most 
[country] people to come and live here; 0 otherwise.  
 
TightImDiff = 1 if answer ‘allow a few’ or ‘allow none’ people of a different race or ethnic group from most 
[country] people; 0 otherwise.  
 
Male = 1 if male, 0 otherwise. 
 
Household size Number of people living regularly as a member of the household. 
 
Upper secondary education = 1 if highest education level is upper secondary, 0 otherwise.  
 
Post-secondary education 
 
= 1 if highest education level is post-secondary and above, 0 otherwise. 
 
Foreign = 1 if born abroad or if one or both parents were born abroad, 0 otherwise.  
 
City = 1 if the respondent lives in ‘a big city’, ‘suburbs or outskirts of a big city’, ‘town or small city’, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Proportion of non-nationals  
 
Proportion of non-nationals in a given occupation and economic sector. Source: European Union 
Labour Force Survey. 
Bad for economy 
 
= 1 if answer to the question: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy 
that people come to live here from other countries?  ’ (0, bad for the economy; … ; 10, good for the 
economy) is <5; 0 otherwise. 
 
Income The annual household income is coded in 12 intervals in thousand of Euros: j (less than €1.8); r 
(€1.8 to under €3.6); c (€3.6 to under €6); m (€6 to under €12); f (€12 to under €18); s (€18 to 
under €24); k (€24 to under €30); p (€30 to under €36); d (€36 to under €60); h (€60 to under €90); 
u (€90 to under €120); n (€120 or more). 
 
Income >=€12,000 and 
<€36,000 
= 1 if annual household income >= €12,000 and <€36,0000 (bands f, s, k, and p), 0 otherwise.  
 
Income>=€36,000 = 1 if annual household income >=€36,000 (bands d, h, u and n), 0 otherwise. 
 
Employment Status:  
Work = 1 if in paid work, 0 otherwise. 
 
Education = 1 if in ‘education’, 0 otherwise. 
 
Retired = 1 if retired, 0 otherwise. 
 
Unemployed = 1 if ‘unemployed, looking for a job’ or ‘unemployed, not looking for a job’, 0 otherwise. 
 
Other = 1 if ‘permanently sick or disabled’, ‘in community or military service’, ‘doing housework, 
looking after children, others’, ‘other’, 0 otherwise. 
 
Non-Economic:  
Bad for culture 
 
= 1 if answer to the question: ‘Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined 
or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (0, cultural life undermined; … ; 
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10, cultural life enriched) is <5; 0 otherwise.  
 
Bad for country 
 
= 1 if answer to the question: ‘Immigrants make country worse or better place to live’ (0, worse 
place to live; … ; 10, better place to live) is <5; 0 otherwise. 
 
Religious  = 1 if answer to the question: ‘How religious are you’, (0, not at all religious; … ; 10, very 
religious) is >5,  0 otherwise. 
 
Right wing  = 1 if answer to the question: ‘In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right” … where 
would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? (0, left; … ; 
10, right)’ >5; 0 otherwise. 
 
Feel unsafe = 1 if answer ‘unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’ to the question to the question: ‘How safe do you – or would 
you - feel walking alone in this area after dark?’ (1, very safe; 2, safe; 3, unsafe; 4 very unsafe), 0 
otherwise. 
 
Objective measures:  
Regional unemployment 
 
Regional unemployment rate at NUTS level 2 for each country. Source: Eurostat. 
 
SSGDP Social security benefits as percentage of GDP. Source: Eurostat. 
 
Crime rate Total crimes recorded by the police divided by population. Source: Eurostat. 
 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in PPS. Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics  
Year 2002 2004 2006 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
TightIm 
0.483 0.500 0.486 0.500 0.449 0.497 
TightImSame 0.329 0.470 0.315 0.465 0.285 0.451 
TightImDiff 
0.463 0.499 0.468 0.499 0.433 0.495 
Male 0.522 0.500 0.502 0.500 0.504 0.500 
Age 
4.709 1.657 4.761 1.654 4.784 1.674 
Household size 2.623 1.317 2.689 1.367 2.663 1.365 
Educational attainment: 
      
Primary 0.321 0.467 0.324 0.468 0.321 0.467 
Upper Secondary 
0.387 0.487 0.364 0.481 0.303 0.459 
Post-secondary education 0.292 0.455 0.312 0.463 0.376 0.484 
Foreign 
0.140 0.347 0.149 0.356 0.143 0.350 
City 0.620 0.485 0.622 0.485 0.620 0.485 
Economic: 
      
Proportion of non-nationals  0.061 0.095 0.068 0.106 0.052 0.069 
Bad for economy 
0.328 0.470 0.373 0.484 0.314 0.464 
Income<€12,000  0.197 0.397 0.255 0.436 0.189 0.391 
Income >=€12,000 and 
<€36,000 
0.496 0.500 0.459 0.498 0.477 0.499 
Income>=€36,000 
0.307 0.461 0.286 0.452 0.335 0.472 
Regional unemployment rate 
0.063 0.038 0.081 0.047 0.071 0.040 
Employment Status: 
      
Work 
0.587 0.492 0.573 0.495 0.594 0.491 
Education 
0.048 0.214 0.041 0.198 0.041 0.199 
Retired 
0.199 0.399 0.225 0.418 0.211 0.408 
Other 
0.129 0.335 0.110 0.313 0.114 0.317 
Non-Economic: 
      
Bad for culture 
0.220 0.414 0.259 0.438 0.237 0.426 
Bad for country 
0.342 0.475 0.350 0.477 0.317 0.465 
Religious 
0.347 0.476 0.347 0.476 0.345 0.475 
Right wing 
0.400 0.490 0.413 0.492 0.401 0.490 
Feel unsafe 
0.195 0.396 0.212 0.409 0.192 0.394 
Number of observations 
16,886 21,701 20,182 
 
Table 3: Attitudinal Responses Disaggregated by Country 
Country Favours Tight 
Immigration 
Favours Tight 
Immigration (same race 
/ethnic origin) 
Favours Tight 
Immigration (different 
race /ethnic origin) 
Immigration is bad for 
the economy 
Immigration is bad for a 
country’s culture 
Immigration is bad for 
the country 
 2002 2004 2006 2002 2004 2006 2002 2004 2006 2002 2004 2006 2002 2004 2006 2002 2004 2006 
 
Austria 0.689 0.543 0.594 0.568 0.340 0.348 0.673 0.526 0.588 0.242 0.378 0.319 0.234 0.333 0.402 0.362 0.438 0.490 
Belgium 0.487 0.483 0.459 0.327 0.312 0.258 0.456 0.467 0.439 0.387 0.448 0.410 0.228 0.243 0.244 0.443 0.395 0.397 
Switzerland 0.357 0.363 0.406 0.195 0.161 0.183 0.341 0.359 0.397 0.184 0.245 0.196 0.168 0.210 0.210 0.217 0.266 0.248 
Czech Republic 0.573 0.634  0.449 0.491  0.540 0.589  0.445 0.503  0.429 0.466  0.471 0.499  
Germany 0.460 0.525 0.523 0.277 0.320 0.309 0.445 0.510 0.506 0.312 0.466 0.402 0.171 0.262 0.266 0.351 0.413 0.427 
Denmark 0.533 0.542 0.481 0.253 0.207 0.146 0.520 0.531 0.474 0.403 0.394 0.287 0.233 0.257 0.223 0.237 0.264 0.204 
Estonia   0.692 0.683   0.436 0.406   0.677 0.672   0.512 0.458   0.438 0.420   0.558 0.525 
Spain 0.503 0.459 0.519 0.441 0.401 0.466 0.483 0.442 0.500 0.261 0.235 0.237 0.201 0.204 0.240 0.358 0.300 0.349 
Finland 0.649 0.638 0.609 0.421 0.428 0.395 0.635 0.624 0.597 0.292 0.362 0.272 0.049 0.090 0.070 0.250 0.247 0.213 
France 0.485 0.506 0.516 0.358 0.358 0.378 0.467 0.482 0.492 0.282 0.373 0.397 0.334 0.353 0.365 0.372 0.396 0.424 
Great Britain 0.515 0.496 0.546 0.355 0.349 0.411 0.498 0.477 0.525 0.442 0.453 0.464 0.341 0.403 0.456 0.418 0.439 0.477 
Greece 0.856 0.803  0.696 0.659  0.854 0.798  0.582 0.558  0.606 0.589  0.633 0.630  
Ireland 0.372 0.381 0.318 0.210 0.263 0.219 0.351 0.366 0.295 0.353 0.241 0.213 0.274 0.241 0.245 0.284 0.261 0.244 
Luxembourg 0.597 0.543          0.457 0.330          0.581 0.525          0.123 0.228          0.102 0.160          0.204 0.321          
Netherlands 0.441 0.461 0.516 0.365 0.334 0.420 0.414 0.436 0.501 0.330 0.393 0.301 0.185 0.206 0.175 0.413 0.384 0.315 
Norway 0.453 0.441 0.425 0.281 0.224 0.217 0.426 0.417 0.412 0.266 0.315 0.266 0.243 0.245 0.240 0.360 0.365 0.329 
Poland   0.433 0.334   0.312 0.211   0.407 0.322   0.406 0.276   0.162 0.126   0.207 0.157 
Portugal 0.620 0.685 0.667 0.557 0.606 0.613 0.612 0.657 0.649 0.382 0.497 0.396 0.286 0.424 0.281 0.558 0.570 0.465 
Sweden 0.179 0.172 0.160 0.113 0.116 0.109 0.170 0.164 0.148 0.274 0.340 0.293 0.095 0.109 0.112 0.162 0.192 0.167 
Slovenia 0.463 0.476 0.464 0.338 0.362 0.309 0.436 0.425 0.435 0.429 0.499 0.479 0.273 0.341 0.328 0.382 0.404 0.377 
Slovakia          0.427 0.446          0.273 0.310          0.394 0.416          0.482 0.405          0.306 0.296          0.381 0.325 
Table 4: Fixed Effect Estimates of Opposition towards Immigration  
(whether same race or different) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant 0.014 0.023** 0.018* 0.018* 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Demographic:     
Male 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Household size 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Highest level of educational attainment:     
Upper secondary 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.006 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Post-secondary education 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Foreign  -0.181*** -0.185*** -0.184*** -0.184*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
City  0.103*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Economic:     
Proportion of non-nationals 0.528*** 0.521*** 0.532*** 0.523*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Bad for economy 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Income >=€12,0000 and <€36,000 -0.065** -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.068** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Income>=€36,000 -0.195*** -0.202*** -0.198*** -0.196*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Regional unemployment 0.188 0.164 0.164 0.201 
 (0.356) (0.357) (0.357) (0.357) 
Employment status dummies (base case -unemployed):     
Work 0.021 0.017 0.012 0.020 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Education -0.313*** -0.315*** -0.315*** -0.313*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Retired 0.059 0.046 0.047 0.057 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
Other 0.151*** 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.151*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) 
Non-Economic:     
Bad for culture 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Bad for country 0.215*** 0.111* 0.160*** 0.170*** 
 (0.027) (0.064) (0.051) (0.061) 
Religious -0.090*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.087*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Right wing ideology 0.350*** 0.343*** 0.343*** 0.346*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Feel unsafe  0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Bad for country x SSGDP  0.562*   
  (0.314)   
Bad for country x Crime rate   1.139  
   (0.899)  
Bad for country x GDP per capita    0.001 
    (0.001) 
Number of observations 2,068 2,066 2,068 2,068 
Number of id 728 727 728 728 
R-squared 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 
Note: Country dummies and time dummies are included in all regressions. SSGDP data is not available for Portugal for the 
third round and this explains the lower number of observations in column 2. Figures in round brackets show standard errors. *, 
**, *** indicate respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level. 
Table 5: Fixed Effect Estimates of Opposition towards Immigration: Same Race/Different Race 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Oppose immigration if immigrants same race  Oppose immigration if immigrants different race 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Constant 0.010 0.005 0.032*** 0.017 0.030*** 0.015* 0.016* 0.020* 0.018* 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Demographic:           
Male -0.023 -0.042 -0.054* -0.048 -0.045 0.160*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Household size 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Highest level of educational attainment:           
Upper secondary 0.004 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Post-secondary education -0.009 -0.027 -0.024 -0.031 -0.030 -0.013 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Foreign -0.192*** -0.196*** -0.206*** -0.203*** -0.216*** -0.178*** -0.177*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.176*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
City 0.146*** 0.155*** 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Economic:           
Proportion of non-nationals  -0.170** -0.158* -0.174** -0.145* -0.190** 0.552*** 0.550*** 0.544*** 0.552*** 0.551*** 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Bad for economy 0.075*** 0.071** 0.067** 0.069** 0.070** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Income >=€12,0000 and <€36,000 -0.020 -0.001 -0.032 -0.025 -0.019 -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.075*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Income>=€36,000 -0.049 -0.036 -0.056 -0.045 -0.039 -0.187*** -0.190*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.190*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Regional unemployment   1.708*** 1.623*** 1.639*** 1.794***  -0.352 -0.338 -0.363 -0.354 
  (0.395) (0.392) (0.394) (0.392)  (0.357) (0.357) (0.358) (0.357) 
Employment status dummies  
(base-unemployed): 
          
Work -0.083* -0.108** -0.122** -0.134*** -0.120** -0.022 -0.017 -0.015 -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Education -0.352*** -0.388*** -0.396*** -0.393*** -0.384*** -0.326*** -0.319*** -0.316*** -0.320*** -0.319*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Retired -0.018 -0.070 -0.112* -0.104* -0.085 0.044 0.054 0.056 0.049 0.055 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
Other -0.028 -0.072 -0.093* -0.097* -0.076 0.133*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) 
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Non-Economic:           
Bad for culture -0.032 -0.021 -0.018 -0.012 -0.017 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Bad for country 0.238*** 0.221*** -0.074 0.064 -0.078 0.261*** 0.264*** 0.223*** 0.237*** 0.271*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.071) (0.057) (0.067) (0.027) (0.027) (0.065) (0.051) (0.061) 
Religious -0.063** -0.049* -0.039 -0.035 -0.034 -0.083*** -0.086*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.086*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Right wing  0.179*** 0.180*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.153*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.352*** 0.352*** 0.356*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Feel unsafe 0.132*** 0.122*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.090*** -0.024 -0.022 -0.027 -0.025 -0.022 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Bad for country x SSGDP   1.593***     0.220   
   (0.345)     (0.315)   
Bad for country x Crime rate    3.248***     0.548  
    (0.994)     (0.901)  
Bad for country x GDP per capita     0.003***     -0.000 
     (0.001)     (0.001) 
Number of observations 2,068 2,068 2,066 2,068 2,068 2,068 2,068 2,066 2,068 2,068 
Number of id 728 728 727 728 728 728 728 727 728 728 
R-squared 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
Note: Country dummies and time dummies are included in all regressions. SSGDP data is not available for Portugal for the third round and this explains the lower number of observations in columns 3 and 8. Figures 
in round brackets show standard errors. *, **, *** indicate respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level.  
 
 
 
Table 6: Interactions with education and gender: Pseudo-Panel  
 Panel A: Gender Panel B: Education 
 TightIm TightImSame TightImDiff TightIm TightImSame TightImDiff 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.018* 0.016 0.019** 0.003 -0.008 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Demographic:       
Male 0.131*** -0.079** 0.163*** 0.073** -0.076** 0.089*** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) 
Household size 0.057*** 0.091*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.089*** 0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Highest level of educational attainment:        
Upper secondary 0.012 0.013 0.007 0.089*** 0.103*** 0.086** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.038) (0.034) 
Post-secondary education 0.024 0.001 0.008 -0.042 -0.066 -0.075* 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038) 
Foreign -0.180*** -0.187*** -0.177*** -0.131*** -0.170*** -0.122*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) 
City 0.114*** 0.192*** 0.093*** 0.102*** 0.164*** 0.099*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
Economic:       
Proportion of non-nationals  0.418*** -0.517*** 0.491*** 0.347*** -0.512*** 0.406*** 
 (0.096) (0.103) (0.096) (0.096) (0.106) (0.096) 
Proportion of non-nationals x Male 0.145 0.613*** 0.059    
 (0.156) (0.168) (0.156)    
Proportion of non-nationals x Upper secondary 
education 
    
0.946*** 
 
0.588*** 
 
0.814*** 
    (0.207) (0.227) (0.207) 
Proportion of non-nationals x Post-secondary 
education 
   0.401** 1.587*** 0.245 
    (0.195) (0.214) (0.195) 
Bad for economy 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.199*** 0.139*** 0.108** 0.127*** 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.041) (0.045) (0.040) 
Bad for economy x Male -0.094 -0.145** -0.111*    
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.062)    
Bad for economy x Upper secondary    -0.046 0.034 -0.030 
    (0.075) (0.082) (0.075) 
Bad for economy x Post-secondary education    0.016 -0.146 0.166** 
    (0.081) (0.089) (0.081) 
Income >=€12,0000 and <€36,000 -0.066** -0.004 -0.075*** -0.064** -0.010 -0.086*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) 
Income>=€36,000 -0.189*** -0.015 -0.188*** -0.158*** -0.008 -0.141*** 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038) 
Regional unemployment 0.189 1.698*** -0.352 0.278 1.988*** -0.073 
 (0.356) (0.385) (0.357) (0.360) (0.395) (0.359) 
Employment status dummies (base-unemployed):       
Work  0.001 -0.146*** -0.034 0.052 -0.053 0.026 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.044) 
Education -0.331*** -0.420*** -0.331*** -0.213*** -0.305*** -0.231*** 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.062) (0.063) (0.069) (0.063) 
Retired 0.052 -0.083 0.046 0.039 -0.051 0.037 
 (0.053) (0.058) (0.053) (0.054) (0.059) (0.054) 
Other 0.151*** -0.062 0.142*** 0.214*** 0.055 0.189*** 
 (0.051) (0.055) (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.052) 
Non-Economic:       
Bad for culture 0.185*** 0.109*** 0.086** 0.159*** 0.145*** 0.167*** 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.045) (0.040) 
Bad for culture x Male -0.091 -0.291*** -0.001    
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 (0.065) (0.070) (0.065)    
       
Bad for culture x Upper secondary    -0.063 -0.439*** -0.126 
    (0.077) (0.085) (0.077) 
Bad for culture x Post-secondary education    0.094 -0.035 -0.184** 
    (0.074) (0.081) (0.074) 
Bad for country 0.122*** -0.019 0.208*** 0.302*** 0.196*** 0.323*** 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.040) (0.042) (0.046) (0.042) 
Bad for country x Male 0.187*** 0.466*** 0.110*    
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.064)    
Bad for country x Upper secondary    -0.470*** -0.144 -0.440*** 
    (0.089) (0.098) (0.089) 
Bad for country x Post-secondary education    -0.039 0.015 0.042 
    (0.075) (0.082) (0.075) 
Religious -0.092*** -0.053** -0.089*** -0.070*** -0.056** -0.059** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
Right wing 0.349*** 0.181*** 0.352*** 0.349*** 0.169*** 0.326*** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) 
Feel unsafe 0.005 0.129*** -0.028 -0.025 0.076** -0.064** 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) 
No. of Observations 2068 2068 2068 2068 2068 2068 
No. of id 728 728 728 728 728 728 
R-squared 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.66 0.49 0.66 
Note: Country dummies and time dummies are included in all regressions. Figures in round brackets show standard errors. *, **, *** indicate respectively 
10, 5 and 1 percent significance level. 
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Appendix  
 
Table 1a: Pooled sample 
Country ESS Round 1 ESS Round 2 ESS Round 3 Total 
Austria 1,923 1,915 2,092 5,930 
Belgium 1,477 1,494 1,541 4,512 
Switzerland 1,827 1,866 1,647 5,340 
Czech Republic 1,159 2,331 0 3,490 
Germany 2,475 2,473 2,571 7,519 
Denmark 1,410 1,349 1,361 4,120 
Estonia 0 1,772 1,358 3,130 
Spain 1,317 1,109 1,594 4,020 
Finland 1,874 1,894 1,767 5,535 
France 1,337 1,640 1,807 4,784 
Great Britain 1,948 1,691 2,252 5,891 
Greece 1,895 1,904 0 3,799 
Ireland 1,760 1,984 1,477 5,221 
Luxembourg 1,037 1,339 0 2,376 
Netherlands 2,132 1,745 1,748 5,625 
Norway 1,714 1,684 1,636 5,034 
Poland 0 1,468 1,456 2,924 
Portugal 1,258 1,575 1,833 4,666 
Sweden 1,914 1,854 1,760 5,528 
Slovenia 1,253 816 1,187 3,256 
Slovakia 0 1,054 1,377 2,431 
Total 29,710 34,957 30,464 95,131 
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Table 2a: Pseudo-panel 
Country ESS Round 1 ESS Round 2 ESS Round 3 Total 
Austria 40 29 54 123 
Belgium 42 28 46 116 
Switzerland 55 34 39 128 
Czech Republic 36 45 0 81 
Germany 47 41 54 142 
Denmark 37 21 32 90 
Estonia 0 49 51 100 
Spain 37 28 37 102 
Finland 29 43 43 115 
France 32 26 36 94 
Great Britain 41 46 36 123 
Greece 30 31 0 61 
Ireland 39 39 37 115 
Luxembourg 31 29 0 60 
Netherlands 63 20 35 118 
Norway 39 51 37 127 
Poland 0 31 30 61 
Portugal 36 28 44 108 
Sweden 39 35 39 113 
Slovenia 30 36 25 91 
Slovakia 0 29 37 66 
Total 703 719 712 2,134 
  
 
 
Table 3a:  Percentage of employed people by education and country of birth 
Highest level of 
educational 
attainment: 
All Nationals Born in an EU 
country 
 
Born in a non-EU 
contry 
Up to secondary 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.28 
Upper secondary 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.42 
Post-upper secondary 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.28 
Source: Eurostat – EU LFS 
Note: The table presents averages across countries included in our sample. There are two exceptions to this: the data 
only allow us to separate nationals from non-nationals in Ireland and Germany.  
 
 
